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Abstract 
Thales UK employs around 3,000 engineers, over half of which are systems engineers, delivering solutions from transport 
systems and secure transactions to integrated communications, naval sensors, and air defense systems.  The Systems Engineering 
(SE) function within Thales UK seeks to minimize the impact of, or eliminate problematic SE projects. Here, problematic 
projects are defined as ones where the SE group on a project was expected to deliver certain characteristics against cost/time 
constraints arising from the problem context, however the project did not, or will not meet expectations by a significant margin. 
A traditional view is that the impact to the Company of problematic projects can be minimized by early detection and subsequent
intervention by SE leadership.  As such, Thales UK seeks to implement an approach that will alert SE staff and leadership to the 
presence or development of problematic projects, such that appropriate interventions can be made. 
Literature regarding SE technical metrics explores the development, and less frequently, the use of metrics to provide information 
to project teams to support judgments about current versus desirable positions.  No literature has been identified that describes 
how SE technical metrics could be used en-masse to provide insight in to the performance of a diverse portfolio of SE projects.  
Thales UK has mandated the collection of a set of SE technical metrics on all SE projects, and understands that the reported data 
requires interpretation and relation to context. The context of each project is different and dynamic. This presents a challenge 
when attempting to use this data to draw conclusions regarding the health of all projects across an enterprise, and the health of the 
operation of an entire engineering function. 
This paper describes a quasi-experiment with SE leaders and project technical metrics from a range of domains within Thales UK 
to test whether expert judgment can determine if a project is problematic or not from metric data alone. A separate research 
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activity is then presented which moves toward a theory of how a metrics approach could be structured for use across a diverse 
range of SE projects to detect characteristics of problematic projects 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the University of Southern California. 
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1. Introduction 
Stakeholders who would benefit from improving the reliability of Systems Engineering (SE) project delivery are 
numerous, and spread across the globe.  Thales UK is one of these stakeholders, as an organisation that at any one 
time has many active SE projects across a range of domains in its project portfolio.  Thales UK seeks a method by 
which the occurrence of problematic projects can be reduced, and the early awareness of problematic projects by SE 
leadership can be increased.  This paper first presents a literature review of methods to measure and forecast the 
current and future position of SE projects.  It then describes two discrete research activities.  The first research 
activity is a quasi-experiment which investigates whether SE technical metrics, whose collection had been mandated 
for all SE projects in Thales UK, provided enough information to reliably alert SE leadership of whether a SE 
project was, or was becoming, problematic. This research activity used a positivist paradigm. The second research 
activity is a qualitative study towards a theory of what metrics could be used to alert SE leadership to problematic 
projects.  The qualitative study asked the question ‘how do people find out what they need to know?’ and used an 
interpretivist paradigm. 
 This research was carried out by the author as part of the University of Bristol Engineering Doctorate (EngD) in 
Systems.  The Systems EngD seeks to embed research in industry; it seeks to solve real-world industry-based 
problems while also performing doctoral level research as described by Godfrey 1.  The strength of an interpretivist 
paradigm is in its ability to help understand the problem, but it is weaker in guiding us towards robust validation of 
the success of actions taken to address the problem.  A positivist paradigm is weaker in helping us develop a robust 
understanding of the problem, but if we were to develop and implement a solution, it would be able to tell us clearly 
whether or not the action had solved the problem as we understood it. 
Faced with this dilemma, this EngD seeks to take the best from both worlds, via a critical realism approach.  
Within the critical realism paradigm, the day-to-day industrial interactions combined with formal learning 
requirements of an EngD drives an action-research approach, which iterates through the steps of Plan-Act-Observe-
Reflect. The critical realism paradigm that provides the context for the action research loops that are executed within 
the EngD ensures philosophical consistency and rigor of the whole research endeavor, while allowing suitable 
adoption of varying philosophies for specific activities, tasks, or elements 2,3,. An understanding of this philosophy is 
key when considering the coherence of methods used here, understanding if or when insights, approaches, or results 
from this research could be generalized, and the applicability of various bodies of literature to this research 4,5,6.  
2. Early determination of SE project health 
2.1. Literature Review  
The key publication that suggests it is possible to monitor variables during SE project technical development, 
such that warning signs could be detected and then successfully acted upon, is the System Engineering Leading 
Indicators Guide 7. The current guide, version 2.0 builds upon an earlier release from 2007, and like its predecessor, 
garners input from industry, academia, and government. The document presents and describes the use of 18 SE 
leading indicators which ‘support the effective management of systems engineering by providing visibility into 
expected project performance and potential future states’7.  Application of the leading indicators by NAVAIR 7, on 
an Alpha Systems avionics project 8,and on a number of high speed sled testing programs within one organization 9
represent the total body of literature covering application of systems engineering leading indicators described in 7. 
NAVAIR initially developed their Advanced Leading Indicator (ALI) approach by making use of a substantial 
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repository of data from previous programs, however they were not able to increase the number of parameters used 
beyond the initial set due to a lack of data availability. Flynn 8 retrospectively viewed project technical metrics for a 
single avionics project. The SE development phase ‘ran approximately 60% over budget and 45% behind schedule’, 
however ‘the project is considered a successful endeavor by Alpha Systems and the customer. Several offspring of 
this lead product are in development and fully funded’ 8. This evaluation also discovered ‘the inadequacy of existing 
historical data, even in organization rated CMMI level 3 or greater, to support setting of thresholds or reconstructing 
time histories of the salient features of the development phase’ 8.  Knorr 9 applied SE leading indicators to high 
speed sled testing programs.  Upper and lower bounds for parameters were set using data from previous projects, 
then evolving traces from current projects were mapped on to the same chart.  Knorr 7 found that in many instances 
the current projects remained within bounds of previous projects, but sometimes extended past the bounds of 
previous projects.  When this occurred, this did not automatically constitute a negative outcome ‘for the information 
obtained from the different LI trends to be interpreted properly, the user, normally a PM or systems engineer, must 
be familiar with the project or system’ 9. Review of these documents in the round draw attention to the practical 
difficulty of applying metrics that require calibration or validation by use of historic data, since relevant historic data 
is rarely held. The importance of judgment and context is also relevant, as the definition of a failure or a problem 
can vary.  A project that was late and over budget was considered a success by Alpha Systems. Proper interpretation 
of the behavior of one project still requires the judgment of an expert who understands project context, even in a 
case where the upper and lower bound behaviors of many similar projects were available. 
A slightly different body of literature is based on parametric estimation, of either SE project end-state 10, or SE 
project end-state plus milestones 11,12. Parametric estimation focuses on estimating cost, duration, project success, 
and technical quality, for example, rather than values of specific technical metrics. If literature is able to describe 
how to easily and accurately forecast end-states, this may at least allow some kind of extrapolation from existing 
position to the future, allowing comparison of projected future position against forecast end-state. Valerdi 10 
describes COSYSMO, which uses a parametric estimation method to develop estimates of systems engineering 
effort. For a subset of SE projects, COSYSMO was able to forecast SE effort to within 30% accuracy 50% of the 
time 10.  Research in to the return on investment in SE shows that SE effort correlates with schedule and budget 
adherence, and overall project success, but not to technical quality 11.  Honour 11 research describes how to estimate 
the total amount of SE that should be directed towards a project, and how much of each type of SE should be carried 
out to maximize project value and success.  The method can be used to develop target points for the amount of each 
type of SE effort put towards, for example, system architecture.  In the development of the analysis in 11, outlier 
projects from the dataset were removed, and none included agile lifecycles, model-based systems engineering or 
lean approaches to SE.  Without knowing why some projects don’t closely match the calculated trend lines, but still 
meet technical requirements, budget and schedule, this approach to directing SE effort in search of project success 
must be used with caution.  This work does provide an example of the range of performance that is seen in a 
portfolio of SE projects.   
Elm and Goldenson 12 shows that projects using higher levels of SE are more likely to perform well.  This 
approach doesn’t forecast which projects will become problematic, or tell us which ones are problematic, rather it 
may allow us to forecast which projects have a greater chance of becoming problematic.   
The absence of literature describing how to monitor SE projects so they avoid becoming problematic has not 
removed the practical demands for systems engineers in industry to produce cost and schedule forecasts for SE 
work. Best practice in SE forecasting was gathered from Thales Group.  One business has a track record of 
consistently forecasting cost to within 10% accuracy using a bespoke parametric estimation method.  This Dutch 
business serves a stable and long-standing market, as such, its methods and successes are not transferrable to other 
Thales businesses. Bottom-up cost estimates are often performed, then a target price for SE activities on an entire 
project is negotiated by systems engineers with the programme management community.  In some instances bespoke 
parametric estimation based on historical data were performed to allow comparison with a bottom-up estimate.  If 
the two estimates were within 20% of each other, the bottom-up cost estimate was used.  On further interrogation, 
the data used to develop the bespoke parametric estimates contained previously undetected errors. One Thales UK 
business had attempted to use COSYSMO, however, they found they did not have the historic data needed to tailor 
it to their business, and without tailoring, it was thought that on balance COSYSMO did not provide a significant 
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improvement compared to the current bottom-up cost estimating method in use. In all Thales Group cases described 
here, there is an established pedigree of delivering non-problematic projects.   
  While the body of SE metrics and estimation literature does not currently tell us how to determine whether our 
individual or portfolio of active SE projects is or will be problematic, SE projects are still successfully delivered by 
a range of organizations across the globe. While the literature has not yet put forward a methodology to use that will 
tell us when a project is problematic on the basis of technical measures, there is evidence that people are able to 
know when they are working on a problematic project “upper management kept telling the customer ‘oh, it’s two 
weeks, it’s two weeks’. You could have asked anyone on that team how long it would have been and I think the 
minimum answer would have been six months” (Interviewee #4). 
The literature reviewed above is derived from a purely positivist perspective using quantitative methods. This 
review suggests there is room to investigate this subject area using alternative research approaches.     
2.2. The current state of Thales UK systems engineering technical metrics 
In 2011 Thales UK mandated the use of SE technical metrics, and in particular a set of tailored systems 
engineering leading indicators that would help SE projects to monitor progress, to see if intervention was needed to 
ensure successful delivery, to communicate project maturity to SE leadership, and to communicate state of 
completion to the project management community.  If these issues were successfully addressed, it was expected that 
the number of problematic projects would drop dramatically, and problematic projects, if they did occur, would be 
known about sooner, and would be a consequence only of the very difficult work that Thales is often involved in, 
and not through mis-management, poor communication, or apparently perverse decision-making.  
The metrics that were mandated first were a Requirement Status Metric, a Technical Artifacts Metric, and a 
Problem Reports Metric 13. These were chosen because these kinds of metrics were either in use (therefore must be 
useful) across many parts of the Company already, and if they weren’t, then starting to use them was regarded as 
being achievable.  These metrics were consistent with industry guidance at the time 7. The metrics had been 
specifically defined by working groups, and were therefore thought to have buy-in across the diverse set of Thales 
UK businesses. The metrics at this point had been defined, described, their collection had been mandated, and their 
inclusion in the project information pack which is reviewed by the project management community was also 
mandated.  The notion was that uniform SE metrics should be used across all UK qualifying projects to allow high 
level review by senior staff not involved in the project itself, and to facilitate cross-project learning about what 
strong and weak signals of problems or success look like from gathering the data in a central repository. 
Since Thales sought to monitor the presence of problematic projects across a range of technical domains and 
across a wide portfolio of projects, the possibility of determining meaning (the presence or absence of problematic 
projects) automatically, from analysis of the numbers reported was attractive.  As described above, literature was 
reviewed and no material offering guidance on how to do this was found.   
A quasi-experiment was therefore designed that presented Thales SE experts with SE technical metrics for a 
range of projects, and record their descriptions of how they interpreted the metrics – essentially they were asked to 
‘think out loud’.  If the findings, and methods each interviewee used were consistent, and could be automated, a 
method for quickly, clearly, and consistently analyzing and summarizing the health of the UK portfolio of SE 
projects may be discovered. 
Eight projects were selected from all that had collected and submitted metrics so far 14.  The projects had reported 
between 3 and 16 months of data, with the average report including 8 months of data.  The metrics were presented 
individually and anonymously to four leading systems engineers in Thales.  The health of a project can only be 
judged by the presence, or absence of features that denote problematic characteristics that are either manifest now, 
or will become manifest in the future.  After removing projects that interviewees were familiar with from the 
sample, each interviewee was presented with a sample of either 6 or 7 projects from the set of 8.  
The author participated in the design of the quasi-experiment and interviews, and completed the analysis of the 
interview transcripts as described here.  Interviewee responses regarding the health of each project were placed in 
one of five categories, as shown in Table 1 which ranged from certainty about presence of a problem currently or in 
the future to certainty that there were no signs of a problem currently or in the future. 
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For the hypothesis that a suitably qualified systems engineer can determine the health of a project (identify either 
the presence or absence of problematic features) by review of technical metrics to be true, the responses given by 
interviewees would have to be the same for each project, and specific rather than uncertain. Table 1 shows the range 
of responses from each interviewer (A-D) for each project.   
 
Table 1. Interviewee judgments of project health 
 There are 
definitely 
current or 
future 
problems 
Uncertain, but 
there are signs 
of current or 
future 
problems 
Don’t Know Uncertain, but no 
apparent signs of 
current or future 
problems 
There are no 
signs of current 
or future 
problems 
Project 1 B C,D A   
Project 2 
Project 3 
 
 
A 
 
D 
B 
 
D 
 
C 
Project 4 
Project 5 
Project 6 
Project 7 
Project 8 
 
B 
 
C,D 
A.B.C 
A 
C 
B 
B,C 
D 
 
 
A,D 
B 
 
 
B,D 
 
The results showed 11 of the 26 judgments given were ‘don’t know’, in more than 40% of all cases the 
interviewees were not able to judge the health of the project from review of the technical metrics. Only 5 of the 26 
judgments given were conclusive; there either definitely was a problem, or there definitely was no sign of a 
problem. In cases where interviewees were definite, these judgments weren’t uniformly shared by the other 
interviewees when reviewing the same data.  There were no cases where interviewees gave contradictory judgments 
on project health (e.g. one interviewee knew, or suspected there were problems, while another knew or suspected 
there were no problems). A definition of how to determine presence or absence of problems, or problem indicators 
was not given. Interviewees used their own judgment, based on their experience and perceptions. Individual 
responses were pair-wise compared to reveal any biases one individual may have compared to other interviewees, 
none were found.  
These results demonstrate that it is not possible to judge the health of an SE project solely by review of the 
Thales UK technical metrics by SE experts familiar with the organisation. There is clearly some commonality of 
response between interviewees, though this hasn’t been thoroughly analyzed.  Review of the SE metrics in this form 
may be enough to direct focused questioning or additional data queries, which then allows expert judgment to be 
made regarding the health of the project. Exploration of the necessary combination of standard data, unique follow-
up investigations, knowledge of project context, and expertise required to discern meaning from data is of 
paramount importance in determining how the health of not just one, but a portfolio of systems engineering projects 
can be determined. The findings of this quasi-experiment may be regarded as obvious by the practicing systems 
engineer, but it has not been explicitly proven in literature, so it is a necessary first step for subsequent 
investigations.   
3. A qualitative study – how do people find out what they need to know? 
3.1. Background 
Thales UK has delivered many systems engineering projects, with results falling on “a continuous spectrum from 
satisfactory to tragic” (Interviewee C). Some projects used mandated or bespoke technical metrics, some didn’t. 
Central to the notion that ‘metrics are useful to a project’ is the idea that if people have information, they can do 
something purposeful with it. This information is central to the operation of, for example, OODA Loops, Plan-Do-
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Check-Act cycles, or any control loop concept that strives to facilitate monitored or managed transition from current 
state to desired state.  
A constructivist ontological position was taken (where it is understood that individual realities are constructed by 
each observer) to perform a qualitative study.  This ontological position helps develop an understanding of how and 
why information is obtained and used in SE project development.  Any patterns discovered here may give us 
direction towards identifying additional means of obtaining and supplying information to systems engineers, or give 
us direction towards the type of automated data analysis, or expert review that systems engineers would find most 
beneficial.   
3.2. Aims and objectives 
The aim was to investigate how engineers engage with information to facilitate self-driven problem solving, to 
support the development of a systems engineering project in Thales UK. The objectives were to explore how 
individuals working on a systems engineering project decided what they needed to know, how they found it out, and 
how they then acted. 
3.3. Methodology 
A qualitative study was carried out because it facilitates a greater understanding of how and why activities occur, 
which may lead to the development of a richer theory of how metrics are, and can be useful 15.  The degree to which 
any theory constructed from this discrete research activity could be generalized is, at this point, unknown. This 
research activity resides purely in the interpretivist paradigm. The critical realist approach of the overall EngD 
would also allow for any theory that is developed from this discrete research activity to be tested for validity and 
generalizability using positivist and objective means. To date this work has not been carried out.  
3.4. Data Collection and Analysis 
Data was collected via 1:1 semi-structured interviews performed by the author. The interviewees were selected 
by the author’s industrial supervisor based on the following criteria: the author should be unknown to the 
interviewees (having carried out previous research within Thales UK SE, the author was known to many staff within 
the function, it was thought that prior knowledge of the author’s research themes would not allow interviewees to 
respond with an unbiased view); the group should be between 4 and 6 people; the interviewees should have worked 
concurrently on a large complex systems engineering project in Thales UK that did not use the Thales UK SE 
technical metrics; each interviewee should have had their own responsibilities on the project, and those 
responsibilities should have partially overlapped or integrated with the roles of other interviewees.  
The interview questions were structured to allow an exploration of how the interview subjects approached their 
work on this project, and elsewhere, with a focus towards asking: how they knew what they should be doing; how 
they decided what they would do; how they knew whether they were doing it; if, or how they knew their work was 
complete and correct; and how they knew how their work supported or integrated with the work of others. The data 
gathered allowed an archival analysis, from the perspectives of each of the interviewees.  The questions were 
designed such that the answers and subsequent discussion may provide insights as to the presence of factors that 
suggest or demonstrate that an SE project is being purposefully directed toward an understood end-state.   
The author interviewed 4 people. In advance of the interviews, each interviewee was sent information regarding 
the nature of research activity, the collaboration agreements between Thales UK and the University of Bristol, the 
confidentiality of information provided, and the wish to record the discussions for the purposes of providing rigor to 
the research approach.  The interviewees each gave permission for the discussions to be audio recorded; recordings 
were subsequently transcribed for analysis.  The interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 1hour 4 minutes. The 
transcripts ranged from 7,200 words to 11,400 words. 
All interviewees described aspects of the project they had all worked on concurrently, which is now complete.  
They each focused on the main aspects of their involvement, and their understanding of relevant wider issues and 
circumstances.  
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Interviewee 1was a system design specialist who did not manage a team of staff, but was an on-call expert who 
assisted staff with technical issues. Interviewee 2 managed the work of a team of around 10 people, and was 
responsible for development of a specific sub-system. Interviewee 3 managed the work of a team of around 15 
people, and was responsible for testing the solution and sub-systems. Interviewee 4 managed the work of a team of 
around 5 people, and was responsible for the development of a specific sub-system. 
Each interviewee had their own responsibilities, however they did also collaborate on elements of work.  Table 2 
denotes the close working relationships: 
 
Table 2. Close working relationships of interviewees 
 Interviewee 1 Interviewee 2 Interviewee 3 Interviewee 4 
Interviewee 1 - X X X 
Interviewee 2 
Interviewee 3 
X 
X 
- 
 
 
- 
 
X 
Interviewee 4 X  X - 
 
The project they all discussed ran for 6 years, three interviewees had worked on the project for its entire duration, 
the other (interviewee 4) worked on the project for its final 3 years.  During the middle third (measured by duration) 
of the project the interviewees stated that the project had fallen about two years behind, and the expected delivery 
date was looming.  Various steps were taken, and the project was ultimately delivered successfully. In this case, 
‘success’ meant the solution was delivered, meeting the technical requirements of the customer, and the Thales 
business that developed the solution continues to work with the technology as a basis for products sold to other 
customers. The interviewees all described the working environment before, during, and after the interventions that 
ultimately led to delivery of the project. Statements describing the project included: 
 
x Interviewee 1:‘it got very chaotic and because we were so far behind it just ended up that all you were doing was 
firefighting’ 
x Interviewee 2:‘it was a very difficult programme, it was highly stressful’ 
x Interviewee 3:‘we didn’t really have control over the project’ 
x Interviewee 4:‘chaos I think would be a good word to describe it’ 
 
In asking how interviewees decided what they needed to know, how they obtained the information, and what they 
did with it, descriptions of context, measurement, and intervention methods were given by each interviewee.  Each 
interviewee also, to a greater or lesser extent, described engaging in problem solving activities that transitioned a 
situation from a poor state to an improved state. In each case described, the interviewees either individually, or with 
each other ‘designed’ their own problem solving approach. In some circumstances (interviewee 2 and 4) 
interviewees were able to engage the teams they were responsible for in changing working methods so the revised 
problem solving, measurement, monitoring, and intervention approaches helped drive the technical development of 
their respective sub-systems to completion.  Interviewee 1 and 2 described how they worked together, and engaged 
interviewee 3 to develop and implement a measurement, monitoring, and intervention mechanism that covered the 
entire technical project.  The scope of this activity was beyond the remit of Interviewee 1 and 2’s position, however, 
they described methods they used to engage project management stakeholders, which demonstrated that effort was 
required to influence the social system as well as the technical system to affect purposeful change in working 
methods and outcomes. Interviewee 4 described actions that brought rigor to the development of the sub-system 
they were responsible for, that were initiated and completed in the face of the on-going ‘chaos’ of the wider project. 
Interviewee 3 described a lack of control and direction for aspects of the project that were both within and beyond 
their responsibility. Interview transcripts included instances where an individual’s view of their own social and 
technical context was bounded closely, while their colleagues assumed that that person’s view of their social and 
technical context was broader. 
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3.5. Towards developing theory 
The process of analysis considered the data collected and two additional perspectives; the cynefin framework 16, 
and generic problem structuring methods 17. Considering the cynefin framework, interviewees described problematic 
elements of project, which mapped to incoherent or incomplete links between context and measurement/intervention 
approach. Conversely, once problems were resolved, the measurement/monitoring/intervention methods in use 
aligned with the context as the cynefin framework suggests is appropriate.  
The interview data were reviewed for evidence of problem structuring methods in use. The interview transcripts 
contained a great deal of information about three discrete problems that were addressed as part of the project that the 
interviewees worked on together.  Resolution of all three problems showed evidence of including all nine testable 
propositions put forth by Yearworth and White 17. 
Considering analysis of the transcripts and their comparison to the cynefin framework and the constitutive 
definition of problems structuring methods we are led towards a middle-range theory that can guide further research. 
Ensuring alignment of the structure of technical control loops with the technical context (decision-making according 
to the governing context, in cynefin framework parlance) appears to be an approach that, in this case, supported 
unproblematic progress.  The same was true taking a social system view. The counter was also true; an absence of 
this coherence and completeness was observable when problems were rife.  
In developing the intervention approach used to bring about the change from a position of incoherent to coherent 
governing context and decision-making, success mapped to consideration of all 9 testable propositions that comprise 
Yearworth and White’s 17 constitutive definition of problem structuring methods. The data collected did not include 
enough material to determine whether unsuccessful interventions also displayed evidence of use of problem 
structuring methods. 
The data and analysis draws out the following important elements: consideration of technical and social context; 
alignment of control mechanism with context; the perspectives of individuals; technical and social system 
hierarchies; and the approaches used to solve problems. 
In seeking a metrics approach to reduce the number of problematic SE projects in Thales UK, and to provide 
early alerts to SE leadership if problematic projects do occur, both data and an evaluation process to review the data 
are needed. A middle-range theory 18 of how this may be achieved is that: 
 
x Social system architectures which map tight, loose, and no coupling between staff working on different technical 
aspects of the project are developed and maintained by the entire project team. The context of the task that 
coordination or collaboration seeks to complete (simple, complicated, or complex) should align with the social 
methods of interaction, for example, email or other file or message exchange methods may suit coordination over 
a simple task, whereas in-person problem exploration and debate would better suit complex, shared tasks. 
x Technical system architectures are developed and maintained as the project evolves by the entire project team for 
the solution as-is (not just for the final system). Control methods used to check progress and direct further 
technical development are aligned with the technical context of the task at hand. This approach accommodates 
the reality that elements of an SE project change context, as development progresses. It also provides a structure 
to deal with brownfield projects.  
x A report of the current social system and technical system architecture completeness, along with notes on how 
control of the elements and couplings in the systems is affected would provide SE leadership with an insight of 
the current level of control in project development, and highlight areas that may be, or have the potential to 
become, problematic by virtue of incomplete or incoherent alignment of context with decision-making approach. 
x Where problematic areas are identified, problem structuring methods are used to move towards resolution. Use of 
problem structuring methods are measured through evidence of all 9 testable propositions suggested by 
Yearworth and White 17 
 
It is proposed that the use of dynamic, shared, social and technical systems architectures would reduce the 
potential that issues of hierarchy and assumptions of colleague’s contextual perspective have to allow problems to 
develop, grow, and remain undetected.  
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3.6. Discussion 
The ‘problem’ of reducing and providing early alerts of problematic projects in Thales UK is itself a complex 
technical problem. Engaging with research and industrial communities to move forward from the current position is 
a complex social task. This separation of technical and social problems is artificial; rather this is a complex socio-
technical problem.  The middle-range theory proposed draws together abstractions that are close to the data 
collected, and cannot be generalized at this stage. In the parlance of the cynefin framework 16, the presentation of 
this middle-range theory probes the industrial and academic communities. 
The research activity itself must be critiqued.  The author is not extensively experienced in interpretivist research. 
Review of transcripts revealed instances where interviewees gave responses that were not explicit.  With greater 
interview skills, these responses could have been explored and clarified at the time, which would have led to a more 
complete set of responses that could be reviewed.  This may have led to the generation of an alternative, or richer 
theory. The method of performing an archival analysis by gathering the views of interviewees in retrospect may also 
mean that perceptions of the situation have changed over time. 
Whilst the version of the cynefin framework cited here was published in 2007 16, its origins stem from the 1990’s. 
The constitutive definition of a problem structuring method is a new development.  This research has therefore taken 
a new framework, applied it in a new way, and developed theory from that point. The constitutive definition of non-
codified problem structuring methods, in being submitted for peer review, seeks criticism from the Operations 
Research community, at the same time its application here seeks critique from the systems engineering research 
community. 
An interpretivist approach to validating findings is also new territory for the author, and industrial colleagues. 
Interpretivist validation of the research method and middle-range theory would involve review by experts, and 
interview participants to determine whether the findings are representative and reproducible, to the extent that 
another researcher could investigate the same area and draw out the same key issues, allowing for possibly 
alternative methods of conceptualizing what was heard.  Elements of this middle-range theory have been presented 
back to interviewees, and the SE leadership within Thales UK.  While industrial colleagues are intrigued by this 
approach to developing theory, and find the theory resonates with their experience, refinement and proof of the 
value of the theory will likely be carried out from a positivist perspective, which is entirely compatible with the 
over-arching approach of EngD research.  
4. Conclusion 
In search of a method to alert Thales UK SE leadership to the existence of problematic projects within the 
portfolio of SE projects, the traditional methods of measuring, predicting, and judging current and desired state of 
SE work were explored.  Methods in the literature were found lacking for these purposes. All literature reviewed 
examined projects at the individual level, none examined projects at the portfolio level.  All literature reviewed used 
quantitative methods and a positivist paradigm.   
Thales UK is using a set of SE technical metrics, which are very similar to a sub-set of 7. The extent to which the 
metrics can be usefully ‘reviewed at length’ was investigated. This investigation found that the information 
presented collectively by a requirements status metric, a technical artifacts metric, and a problem reports metric did 
not allow consistent judgment of project health (i.e. presence or absence of indicators that the project is, or will 
become problematic) by a panel of SE experts.  This investigation provides a starting point from which the 
importance of variables such as additional project data, contextual information, and varying levels of SE expertise, 
etc. can be investigated such that stakeholders can determine the health of a single, or a collection of, SE projects. 
The paper also presents a qualitative study which starts to investigate how the presence, absence, or coherence of 
other factors on an SE project could indicate the current or future presence of problems. The study moves towards a 
theory that makes use of a social and technical system architecture, the cynefin framework 16 to determine alignment 
of context and decision-making methods, and the presence of propositions that collectively describe the use of  
generic problem structuring methods 17. If this type of theory is fully developed and tested for usefulness and 
generalizability, it could form the basis of a metric system that describes and predicts the health of individual SE 
projects, and the portfolio of Thales UK SE projects. 
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